Where to from here: Oslo — drawback or benefit, or statehood and independence?

By Hani al-Masri
Although the war in Gaza brought unprecedented destruction and disasters, it was not decided by a knockout blow for either side. No decisive victory was achieved for Israel or for the Palestinians. Victory is measured by three factors: breaking the will of one side and its surrender, occupying the enemy’s land, and inflicting devastating losses. The outcomes do not show the presence of these factors together or even most of them. It can be said that the resistance held firm and was not defeated, but it did not win; Israel did not win either, and it failed to achieve its major objectives, even though it inflicted massive destruction and huge loss of life. … In such a gray situation the question becomes: where do we go now? Back to a diminished “Oslo,” or a new variant of it? Toward a federation made up of the Gaza Strip — which enjoys some sovereign trappings — and populated cantons in the West Bank, separated from each other and without Jerusalem and without sovereign attributes? Or toward a genuine Palestinian state?
To answer these questions we must stop at a few key points. First, there are factors that stopped the war: the halt was not accidental but the result of interacting basic factors, foremost among them the legendary steadfastness of the Palestinian people, who did not raise the white flag despite the catastrophe, did not rise up against the local authority despite some protest manifestations, and proved determined to remain on their land and to hold their rights — not defeated by killing or extermination. The armed resistance faced Israel’s war machine for two years and remained standing despite the heavy losses it suffered, thwarting the occupier’s objectives; evidence of this is that it undertook security and maintaining public order after the ceasefire was reached.
National unity on the basis of a common program and a clear goal can open the way to a free, independent Palestinian state
There is also the global movement of solidarity with the Palestinians, which reached unprecedented and unexpected levels, influenced many governments, pushed them to impose sanctions on Israel, and changed Israel’s image in world public opinion — revealing it in its true form as a colonial, racist, settler-colonial entity that hides behind the cloak of democracy and is an executioner, not a victim. It is controlled by extremist, racist, bigoted leadership, while its public largely follows a Zionist movement that does not believe in settlement or historical compromises, does not recognize the existence of the Palestinian people or their rights, calls for the displacement of as many as possible, and demands that those who remain accept the Zionist narrative or be subjected to it without rights. That global movement forced some Western governments to impose sanctions on the occupation, which pushed the U.S. administration to act to save itself from the verdict of isolation and to save its ally from itself and those who rule it.
Regional states also moved after Israel crossed every red line, notably by targeting Qatar, the mediating state and a U.S. ally, which showed that Israel is a state that poses a danger to regional security and stability and provoked unprecedented regional anger. The Trump administration also feared that the continuation of the war might threaten U.S. influence and projects in the Middle East, in a changing region and world and amid fierce competition with China for global leadership.
In this context Israel’s internal crises deepened: the war exhausted itself and Israel suffered heavy human, economic and moral losses; the government failed to achieve a clear decisive victory, faced the anger of the street and of the families of the captives, and saw sharp disputes between politicians and the military, and between the government and the opposition, which believed that the persistence of the ruling far right was driving Israel into the unknown. The resistance, meanwhile, found itself in a difficult position facing two bitter options: if it rejected the Trump plan it would be committing suicide and the extermination would continue; if it accepted it with its harsh terms it would be surrendering and confiscating the future of the resistance and the cause. It wisely chose to welcome it in principle to protect its people while seeking to amend it through negotiation.
The second point is that the resistance was not defeated but it did not achieve its goals. It succeeded in surviving and preserving its will, but it did not secure a guaranteed permanent halt to the war, nor a full Israeli withdrawal, nor a comprehensive lifting of the siege, nor the clearing of the prisons, nor the liberation of occupied land, nor protection of the holy sites, nor a halt to settlement. Division deepened; extermination and the plans to liquidate the cause did not finish it, and the monopoly of representation by the Palestine Liberation Organization was undermined, with ideas floated about a colonial trusteeship council for Gaza without Palestinian representation. Meetings and conferences on the Palestinian issue have been held without the participation of the sole legitimate representative, who praises them despite being excluded. Yet the repercussions and backlash of what happened — especially after the crimes committed by Israeli forces, foremost among them extermination, displacement and starvation, and beyond mere retaliation for the “Al‑Aqsa Flood” — revived the Palestinian cause and reimposed its centrality on Arab regimes, led broad sectors across the globe to adopt the Palestinian narrative, and made recognition of a Palestinian state a near‑universal global consensus.
As for Israel, it failed to achieve its goals: freeing the captives by force, eliminating Hamas, displacing the Palestinians from their homeland (the main objective), occupying and settling the Gaza Strip and annexing the West Bank — despite the destruction it inflicted on Gaza, which produced a quarter of a million dead, wounded and missing. The war exposed Israel’s internal fragility and weakened the myth of the “invincible army,” although that does not mean that the occupation state has collapsed or is on the verge of collapse. But the continued dominance of the expansionist Zionist colonial project that believes in wars and in the logic that what force cannot achieve is achieved by more force will lead to its eventual undoing — especially since it appeared dependent on the United States and reliant on it; without U.S. backing it would suffer a catastrophic defeat, and this will later affect its role, standing and importance in the American project in the region.
Israel also failed to “mold Palestinian consciousness”: despite the death and destruction, the broad conviction hardened that Israel can be beaten by will, preparation and organization. On the international level, Israel suffered a major moral loss after appearing to the world as a rogue state practicing genocide and ethnic cleansing, becoming a symbol of racism and colonial violence, while Palestine became the banner of freedom across the globe.
Regarding the post‑war phase (the third point), a ceasefire does not mean the end of the war but a truce that may last, and the war may take other forms different from total destruction and mass extermination, closer to the Lebanese model. It is the beginning of a dangerous transitional political stage that could lead to one of two contradictory tracks. Either a diminished “Oslo” — a return to a form of limited autonomy under international or regional or combined trusteeship, away from the UN framework for a transitional period that may be prolonged, in the absence of sovereignty and with continued Israeli security control. This could take the form of a trusteeship via a “board of directors,” as in the Trump plan, involving Arab and international parties, and could end with the inclusion of the Palestinian Authority after its “renewal” or with a federal formula that brings together Gaza and some populated cantons in the West Bank into a political entity without Jerusalem and without sovereignty. This scenario becomes likely if Palestinian division continues and deepens, and if binding regional and international guarantees and interventions are absent. The second path is a real state and genuine independence, which are possible if three basic conditions are met. First, Palestinian national unity within legitimate, unifying institutions — or at least an initial agreement on a single consensual administration with intellectual, political and party pluralism, away from domination and exclusion, until free and fair elections are held whose results are respected and in which the Palestinian people choose their political project and their representatives in the new phase. Second, a realistic and revolutionary political vision aimed at changing reality rather than adapting to it — not indulging in realism without imagination, nor indulging in imagination without grounding. This must be based on the conviction that Palestine is in a stage of strategic defense and on agreement on an immediate, achievable national goal, such as keeping the cause alive, preserving the Palestinian presence on its land, and thwarting the colonial plans to liquidate the Palestinian cause through annexation, displacement, settlement and extermination, on the way to the central national goal of expelling the occupation and achieving independence. The struggle should adopt an appropriate form for the national goal (protecting the cause, the people and independence), namely popular peaceful resistance, while emphasizing the importance of securing rights through boycott, sanctions and legal accountability for Israel, while retaining the right of resistance in all its forms. Peace cannot be achieved without a fundamental change inside Israel, and that will happen primarily through external pressure. The cause must not be limited to the 1967 lines; rather, efforts should aim to achieve a lasting peace by enabling the Palestinian people to exercise their right to self‑determination and by resolving the refugee issue justly, including the right of return and compensation. Finally, continuous international and regional pressure must link reconstruction and funding to ending the occupation and establishing a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital.
Experience has shown that resistance without a unifying political objective is a gamble, and politics without resistance is submission
The fourth point is the Trump administration’s attempt to shape a new regional order that integrates Israel, blocks China’s expansion in the Middle East, and offers the Palestinians leftovers. But this project will face certain failure if Washington does not realize that Israel — small and incapable of achieving decisive military victory over besieged Gaza — cannot lead the region. Only then will that project fail, and a new Palestinian opportunity may emerge to derail it, provided the national movement renews itself in the interest of its people rather than as a reform that meets hostile preconditions that demand adherence to the Zionist narrative. Alternatively, a new national movement could arise with unified leadership, a single project, determination, political wisdom and courage that invests in regional and global changes rather than being subjugated by them.
Finally: which path will we take? … The coming phase will determine whether we move toward a diminished “Oslo” or toward independence and statehood. Division and internal strife will inevitably lead to the loss of the cause, at best resulting in an entity stripped of sovereignty, whereas national unity on the basis of a common program, a clear goal, an appropriate form of struggle and genuine partnership can open the way to a free, independent Palestinian state.
Experience has proven that resistance without a comprehensive and achievable political goal is a gamble, and politics without resistance is submission. Between gamble and submission there is a third way: revolutionary national realism — to confront reality in order to change it, not to submit to it or to leap over it. The decisive question remains: do we have the will and the consensus to move toward independence and statehood, or will we repeat a diminished or augmented “Oslo” in a different guise?