Doha bombing: a ricocheting shot

By: Rajab Abu Suriya

Israel’s decision to bomb the Qatari capital cannot be seen as an isolated incident — not only in the context of this war, but since Israel’s founding nearly eighty years ago. This is the first time it has bombed a Gulf capital. Unlike many Arab cities and capitals Israel previously struck — Beirut, Tunis and Damascus — those were never outside the Western camp. In this war, however, the Israeli strike on Doha was outside the framework of the conflict Israel has been waging against Iran and the regional allies it labels as Iranian proxies. It is strange that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sought to justify his aggression against the Gulf Arab state by citing its hosting of Hamas leaders, as if he had only discovered that in the hours before last Tuesday. Qatar has hosted Hamas for roughly a decade and a half, specifically since Hamas left Syria after the 2011 Arab Spring. Moreover, Netanyahu personally managed Qatar’s sponsorship of Hamas in Gaza through the millions of dollars that Mohammed al-Emadi used to transfer monthly.

Netanyahu has been sending delegations to Qatar for two years to negotiate with Hamas specifically about a deal to exchange hostages for a halt to the war. To grasp the whole picture: Netanyahu carried out the strike on Doha in an act that can at least be described as the desperate gamble of a man pushed to the brink. Having consistently justified continuing the war by promising an absolute victory he would not accept stopping short of, the continuation of the war indicates that he has not achieved that absolute victory. He raised the stakes so high that it has become almost impossible to achieve his stated aim of reshaping the Middle East — a program that would include the displacement of Gaza’s population, annexation of the West Bank, and total domination of the region — such as he would have tried to do a year ago had he assassinated Hassan Nasrallah and Ismail Haniyeh and carried out the “al-Bajr” operation. But his bombing of Doha is compelling evidence that he has shot himself in the foot as a desperate act. Thus the Doha strike was an attempt to vent hatred and tension. Still, plans drawn up since January, after the second deal, indicate the strike was an option on the table for some time.

The reason the political and military leadership agreed on was to force Hamas to surrender, after it became clear to everyone that Israel had exhausted what it could militarily do in Gaza to achieve displacement or the surrender of the resistance, which continued to inflict casualties on Israeli soldiers. Faced with Gazans’ refusal to abandon their homeland despite daily mass killings and the flattening of the Strip’s cities, the plan was originally proposed by the army. Zamir said targeting Hamas leaders abroad could push Hamas to accept surrender, and that pressure on the field alone would not suffice. Even Netanyahu said angrily: what can we do if they do not care about the daily deaths we inflict on their people? But the question here is: why did Israel choose Qatar and not Turkey or Egypt? Reports indicate that prior to the Qatar strike there were on-the-ground assassination attempts against Hamas leaders in Turkey, and Turkey arrested Mossad agents in connection with those operations. The same was true regarding Egypt. Even immediately after the Doha strike, Netanyahu’s threats carried implications for Egypt and Turkey. Egypt challenged Israel by saying such an act would amount to a declaration of war between the two countries, and went further by inviting resistance factions to take refuge in Egyptian territory.

It seems Israel calculated that any strain in its relationship with Qatar — an informal one in any case, since the two countries do not exchange ambassadors as they do with Egypt and Turkey — would be handled by the current U.S. administration, which is blatantly biased in favor of the Israeli government, not only Israel but in how it would manage the fallout. Israel also appears to have considered military deterrence: despite Qatar’s regional and international political standing and its economic strength, it is poor in population and weak militarily. The U.S. base at Al Udeid did not protect itself from an Iranian strike three months ago, so it could not be relied upon to protect Qatar — from whom? From Israel. With Turkey and Egypt, matters are different: they are two major regional military powers, and Turkey is a NATO member. Both maintain normal diplomatic relations with Israel. Bombing Egypt or Turkey would immediately sever those relations and would provoke a military response, not merely political or legal measures as Qatar would likely pursue.

Reviewing the course of Israel’s war — how it started, how it has proceeded, and where it is heading — one can see it began with Western support that gradually dissipated as global popular protests mounted. After roughly a year it remained at a standstill, demonstrating Israeli battlefield failure and an inability to decisively win despite its superiority in weaponry on land and in the air. Israel then deployed its most important tool, the Mossad, which became more effective than the air force — which, despite retaining superiority with U.S. F-35s, faced effective counters from rockets and drones among its adversaries. Thus, thanks to the Mossad, Israel achieved its most significant results through targeted assassinations in Lebanon and Tehran midway through the war, about a year after it began and about a year ago. After the fronts fell silent — especially following the strike on Iran last June — Steve Witkoff put forward a proposal for a deal that was considered partial, as Netanyahu wanted, and seen as penultimate because it envisaged the release of half of the hostages, both alive and dead.

Netanyahu bet on Hamas rejecting the proposal because it was harsh. Under full battlefield pressure, which halted support fronts particularly in Lebanon and the West Bank and shifted most of the army to the Gaza front, Netanyahu feared a 60-day ceasefire would fracture his coalition or leave the army unwilling to return to war later. Thus he reneged and did not respond to Hamas’s acceptance of the proposal a month earlier, and instead proposed an all-for-all deal but attached conditions that effectively made it: all hostages for unconditional surrender.

The reality is that Netanyahu is now backed up against the wall. Since at least last June the war has unfolded in a single scene: the daily killing of Gaza civilians at a rate of 50–100 dead and 300–500 wounded each day. This killing, accompanied by deliberate starvation, constitutes a clear war crime.

Consequently, the entire world has turned against Israel, and the General Assembly vote a few days ago was telling. Of the 194 countries in the world, only five voted against the New York declaration: Israel and the United States, Hungary, Argentina and Paraguay, along with five microstates of no real weight in international politics. Less than a week later, the bombing of Doha galvanized all Arab and Muslim countries of significant international weight — including Iran, Turkey and nuclear-armed Pakistan — not merely in solidarity with Qatar but to erect a bulwark against the Netanyahu Middle East he dreams of.

Perhaps the clearest sign Netanyahu’s shot toward Doha has backfired is the cascade of declarations that followed, most notably from Egypt and the UAE. The UAE suggested the Abraham Accords could be jeopardized, especially if the West Bank were formally annexed — Abu Dhabi’s signature five years ago was linked to that very threat. Egypt recalled the Arab Joint Defense Declaration from a decade ago and urged its activation, even outlining details for implementation. Iraq went further, turning it into a NATO-like joint defense pact among Islamic states, on the grounds that the Doha summit was Islamic rather than merely Arab. Cairo also called for a Middle East free of nuclear weapons, demanding that a non-proliferation treaty be imposed on all Middle Eastern states — an obvious reference to Israel, the region’s nuclear-armed state, and to the greater problem of its non-disclosure. If pursued, this demand could ease Western pressure on Iran and open the door widely for Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other regional states to acquire nuclear capabilities as a deterrent to Israel’s arsenal, or at least for peaceful nuclear energy development.