Israel acknowledges Gaza war-end terms are unrealistic: “a heavy price”

Voices within Israel are growing for striking a comprehensive deal with Hamas at this time, saying that Israel’s conditions for ending the war in Gaza are unrealistic, and that insisting on them is driven less by security than by Benjamin Netanyahu’s desire to achieve a supposed “image of victory” that will not be realized.

Avi Shilon, a columnist for Yedioth Ahronoth, said that “when Menachem Begin was asked after the peace with Egypt why it succeeded where previous negotiations had failed, he said it was ‘the wisdom of timing.’ Although there may have been many reasons for signing the agreement, timing is indeed an important element in negotiations, whether for peace or for post-war settlements. What is happening now is that Israel missed the right timing to offer a comprehensive deal to Hamas, because despite its collapse, or in fact precisely because it is collapsing, the movement has little left to lose.”

He added that “it is now clear that Tel Aviv also wants to end the war, and that the United States is pressing for an end, but its threat to occupy Gaza is weak because it is clear to all parties that even if an occupation of Gaza causes more damage to Hamas and Gaza’s population, the price Israel would pay — in killed hostages and soldiers, in its image and international pressure, and in the exhaustion of its society — would be extremely high. Thus an absurd situation has arisen that enables the weaker side, Hamas, to set its own terms for ending the war.”

He explained that “even if Israel had offered a single comprehensive deal at an early stage, when the movement’s military and political balance would truly have allowed it to be threatened and to continue the war, it would have ended it more quickly and forced the movement to relinquish power in exchange. But the wisdom of timing was frustrated by political and partisan interests, which now compel the government to continue, even though it is now clear it is no longer interested either.”

He stressed that “timing is not the only problem; Israeli demands are also partly unnecessary. It is correct to insist that Hamas not continue to rule, but talking about exiling its leaders and insisting on a few hundred meters here and there is not really connected to guaranteeing security, but to Netanyahu’s desire to achieve the supposed image of victory. The movement has a few hundred second- and third-tier leaders, and exiling them from the devastated Gaza will not benefit Tel Aviv.”

He explained that “the current situation in the Strip is enough for Israel to leave it and to deprive it of funds for reconstruction, but it insists on conditions related to image, not security, despite trying to simulate the exile of Hamas leaders as a condition for an end — similar to what happened with the expulsion of PLO members, including Yasser Arafat, after the siege of Beirut in the summer of 1982.”

He noted that “militarily, the exile of those thousands was an achievement, but history shows that the organization re-established itself in its new location in Tunisia, and Israel eventually signed an agreement with it in Oslo in 1993, confirming that the solution is political, not military.”

He asserted that “the Israeli demonstrations during the war calling for a deal to free the hostages were also full of mistakes. That deal should have been sought long ago, but the desire to halt the war in the name of saving them turned what should have been an obvious consensus into a partisan political issue, allowing opponents to argue that achieving future security is no less important. The demonstrations should, long ago, have focused on the claim that shortening the duration of the war serves Israelis’ interests, even without taking the hostage issue into account.”