Questions over Trump plan for Gaza after Hamas ‘surrender’?

By Hassan Asfour
After the “executive order” issued by US President Trump — which declared that “any armed attack on the territory of the State of Qatar, its sovereignty or its critical infrastructure is a threat to the peace and security of the United States” — Hamas’s external leadership obtained its first guarantee of “its life” and that Doha will remain a safe haven, and that the “assassination play” will not recur in the near term.

Trump’s bribe to Hamas’s leadership is part of the negotiation angle to speed up the completion of the movement’s “general surrender,” away from language maneuvers that no longer carry political weight and have instead become a time grant for the Jewish fascist state to commit more unique crimes and impose a trajectory even more humiliating in principle — far from the “clatter” of some factional figures who know full well that an end to the genocidal war would mean the end of their existence and, consequently, their self-interests that would not have existed in a healthy national political reality.

Without delving deeply into the discussions about the “illusion” of rejection that some well-off people wish for, Hamas’s leadership lacks the ability for independent decision-making — not only presently because of existence and interests, but also by virtue of its origins and birth from the Islamic complex descended from the broader Brotherhood movement. Therefore, what will be essential is not the Islamist movement’s stance on Trump’s plan: its answer is now filed with the three intelligence services — Egyptian, Qatari and Turkish — awaiting completion of the conditions for its survival and self-preservation.
The practical discussion is about the essence of the mechanism for implementing the Trump plan in the Gaza Strip, especially since talk about the West Bank and Jerusalem under its provisions has entered a complex political maze that would require a “special revolution” to correct.

The central question concerns the “Peace Council”: its composition and function, its role and tasks, its operational mechanisms, its highest decision-making authority, whether the United States has a veto over any of its decisions if they occur, and the role of the Israeli entity — and whether that role is direct or indirect.

From that central issue branch questions that deserve clarification before proceeding further, including the Gaza reconstruction council: its components and contributing countries, on what basis contributions will be discussed, whether the cost study for reconstruction is truly ready or still under consideration, and if so, what the timeframe for its completion is and which parties have approved it — especially as some have already been referenced, including a study issued by a UN-affiliated body.

What political conditions will be tied to reconstruction in the Gaza Strip? Will one of them be not rebuilding refugee camps, and thus not providing the associated educational, health and other services, effectively ending UNRWA’s role entirely in Gaza?

Will financial conditions be subordinated to political ones, determining the nature of the administrative committee branching from the “Peace Council” to manage specified “civil and security affairs,” thereby establishing new operating rules inside Gaza that differ fundamentally from those in the “remnants of the West Bank”? From that, derived questions arise: does the Palestinian Authority’s interior minister have the right to communicate with Gaza’s special “security” apparatus and assign it certain tasks, or is that beyond his competence? Here the issue is examining possible ties.

During the reconstruction period, how can Gaza’s residents live under minimally “human” conditions? Will the tent camps, which have become a new symbol, persist, or are there transitional alternatives until reconstruction is completed?

Is there a preexisting plan for the restoration of normal life during reconstruction, including education and health services in all their facilities and branches?

Does President Mahmoud Abbas have the right to visit the Gaza Strip, or his prime minister and other official Palestinian representatives, after the “Peace Council” is formed and hold meetings with them to determine the orientations of the “administrative committee,” or is that visit deferred because the Authority remains “unqualified”?

Will a “criminal” file be opened against Gaza residents over the great catastrophe of October 7? Assuming that will happen, who has the authority to do so — the “Peace Council” or the “administrative committee” — and what penalties might be expected?

When will Gaza residents currently abroad have the right to return, and are there “security conditions” linked to that issue?

And before all that: what would the scene look like if the formation of the “Peace Council” is delayed, or if the administrative reality in America changes with Trump’s departure — whether by death, assassination, or electoral defeat — is there a “special guarantee” for its continuation along with the reconstruction council?

These are topics to consider about what must be settled before speaking of Hamas’s surrender.

While Gaza residents have the humanitarian right to consider stopping the deaths as a sacred priority for now, the more dangerous aftermath would be the entrenchment of a separation in national consciousness after Hamas, with its dark coup, entrenched a split in existential reality.

Note: The first task of the US “war” minister Hegseth and his lighter moments was to open fire at the fat and bearded in the US military… and you say there is no place for them unless they lose their bellies and shave off their beards… It seems the minister does not know that his deputy is bearded and well-dressed… oh, man, better stop this before you get into trouble, Mr. Single.

Special note: Call.. Call.. Call.. to Colombian President Gustavo Petro — could you tone down your love for Palestine and its people a bit, and stop being the spearhead in every American-Jewish catastrophe? You embarrass people whose blood is not like ours… if they even have blood to begin with… Oh Petro, you are nothing like us… but our people have no equal either… only completely unlike you..